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Agent-Regret and Sporting Glory1  
Jake Wojtowicz 
King’s College, London 
Jake.Wojtowicz@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: When sporting agents fail through wrongful or faulty behaviour, they 
should feel guilty; when they fail because of a deficiency in their abilities, they 
should feel shame. But sometimes we fail without being deficient and without 
being at fault. I illustrate this with two examples of players, Moacir Barbosa and 
Roberto Baggio, who failed in World Cup finals and thus cost their team the 
greatest prize in sport. Although both players failed, I suggest that neither was at 
fault and neither was deficient. I argue that we can fail through no fault of our own 
because our abilities are always fallible. This fallibility means that to succeed—to 
achieve sporting glory—we must run the risk of failure. The appropriate emotion to 
feel over such failures is agent-regret. This picture of agency suggests that sporting 
agents and observers should not take up what I call the “critical position”: the idea 
that someone who fails must be deficient or must have been at fault. This allows for 
a softer, but also more accurate, attitude towards our own failure and the failures of 
others. I end by suggesting that the fallibility of our abilities is made clear through 
playing or watching sport, and this can illuminate life more broadly. 
Keywords: agent-regret; failure; shame; guilt; skills; Bernard Williams; 
Joseph Raz 
 
In this article, I explore the place of agent-regret in sport. I start by introducing ordinary 
regret, guilt, and shame. Regret responds to a variety of bad things, guilt responds to my 
fault or wrongdoing, shame responds to my inability to live up to some standard, agent-
regret responds to a failure of my action.  
How can my action fail, without me being at fault or failing to live up to some 
standard? I argue that agency is based on fallible abilities: even when we exercise our 
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abilities properly they might fail. Just as we can succeed when luck is on our side, as with 
the free-kick that goes in, we can also fail with the free-kick that sails wide. As humans, 
the only way we can act is through these fallible abilities and to be sporting agents who 
seek sporting glory through the success of our abilities is to open ourselves to failure. This 
should lead us to accept a more nuanced view of how sporting agents and observers 
should react to these failures. It is not always appropriate for commentators or fans to 
play the blame game, nor for players to feel guilty; rather we should recognize that people 
can fail without being at fault and agent-regret is the appropriate first-personal reaction to 
such failures.  
Regret, guilt, and shame. 
When it comes to sports, a wide variety of people might come to regret some sporting 
failure. I might regret that the Rochester Red Wings had a bad season or that Leroy Sané 
kept getting called offside against Liverpool in the 2017-18 Champions League quarter-
finals. Someone who regrets that Sané kept getting called offside does not need to be 
involved in the action or hugely invested in what is happening.2 Regret arises when we 
think that it would have been better had things turned out otherwise, and anyone who 
can think it would have been better had things turned out otherwise can feel regret 
(Williams 1981, 27).   
But some emotions arise only in participants. How might Sané, or a Red Wings 
player, feel? Maybe they’ll be annoyed at others: Sané might have been angry at the 
officials, whom he thought were wrongly flagging him offside, or he might have reacted 
with a sanguine acceptance that sometimes things do not always go your way. Our focus is 
on a more specific sort of emotion: not just the emotions we might feel when things do 
not work out, but on the negative emotions that we direct towards ourselves or towards 
what we have done. 
Sometimes the appropriate emotion is something like guilt. One feels guilty when 
one thinks one was at fault (Williams 1981, 30) or did something wrong (Scarre 2017, 
570–71; Baron 1988, 260–61; Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2011, 73–82).3 Now, one 
might construe guilt as ‘moral’ and think that guilt can only apply in situations in which 
one might let others down, such as team sports, or cheat, such as by doping. But we can 
still be at fault or do the wrong thing in non-moral domains. What sort of cases do I have 
in mind? Here are a few cases of doing the wrong thing, or being at fault for some failure: 
• A rugby player kissing his badge before touching down for a game-winning try, 
leaving an opponent enough time catch up and knock the ball out of his hands.  
• A tennis player failing to take account of the wind and thus hitting the ball out 
(Tannenbaum 2007, 53). 
                                                 
2 The tone of the regret we feel can be altered by our relations to a particular event (Wallace 2013, 37–42). 
A fan will feel a deeper regret than a mildly interested party; I just mean to bring out the fact that 
ordinary regret does not presuppose any close involvement. 
3 Even if there are forms of guilt that do not involve wrongdoing or fault, such as survivor guilt (H. Morris 
1988; Velleman 2005), there is a recognisable form of guilt that does involve something like fault and 
this is the relevant notion for this paper. 
 
 
• A footballer pulling back an attacker and earning a red card despite the fact his 
team-mate was covering and could have made the tackle.  
• A footballer trying to score a wondergoal rather than playing in her teammate for 
a tap-in (Smith 2015, 107–8). 
• A player rushing a set-piece and messing up. 
• A player letting her anger get the better of her and punching an opponent under 
the eyes of the referee.  
Of course, some of these things are worse than others: the rugby player deserves to feel 
much worse for what he’s done than the tennis player should feel for a slightly 
thoughtless shot; this is because his behaviour is a more severe wrong both insofar as how 
it disrespects his opponent and because of how it stops his team from winning the game. 
Yet all of these actions might lead to some degree of guilt. From minor mistakes to major 
errors of judgment, from rash decisions to narcissistic ones, guilt concerns doing wrong 
or being at fault. 
Guilt is a self-directed negative emotion that focusses on one’s fault or 
wrongdoing. 
In other cases, people do not just feel bad over some fault or wrongdoing, rather 
they feel bad about the sort of person they are (Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2011, 
chap. 3). This is the domain of shame. Emily Ryall, in this volume, gives a clear overview 
of the various features we might include in an account of shame (Ryall forthcoming). I 
will not weigh in on the debate of how exactly we should construe shame. What matters 
for our purposes is, as Ryall points out, that shame concerns failing against some 
standard; not only does my action fail to meet a standard (I exhibited a fault or it was 
wrong), rather this failure says something about what I am. In shame, I fail to meet a 
standard of being a certain sort of person. 
Shame won’t arise just because of any failure to be a certain way. I must think that 
being that way is important. Ryall suggests that shame arises when we fail to achieve some 
core value (Ryall forthcoming). One of my core values might be that I am a decent squash 
player:  I think that I should have a good backhand because decent squash players have a 
good backhand. I am ashamed by my poor backhand because it shows that I am deficient 
as a squash player, and it is important to me that I am a good squash player. But I do not 
think of myself as a basketballer, which is why my inability to slam dunk the ball arouses 
no shame.4  
Shame and guilt can arise from the same incident. We can even feel both at the 
same time. Of course, when we feel these emotions it can be hard to work out which 
exactly we are feeling; but there are various ways in which we might distinguish shame 
and guilt, such as in terms of the actions they inspire. The point I’ll focus on is that these 
emotions have different objects. Take the player who goes for the wondergoal rather than 
playing in the easy pass. She might come to realize that she does this because she’s 
narcissistic. And she might see how this is a flaw and wish she was more of a team player. 
The player who punches the opponent might be ashamed that she lacks self-control. 
Other players do not show enough commitment, or they’re just bad at a backhand volley, 
                                                 
4 Ori Herstein offers the dunk example at (Herstein 2013, 176–77). 
 
 
or not fit enough. Sometimes players are deficient as sportspeople in general, or specifically 
as, say, footballers. And when we are deficient, we might feel shame.  
Shame is a self-directed negative emotion that focusses on one’s failure to 
meet a standard of being a certain way (and one thinks it is important for one 
to be that way). 
Guilt and shame both play an important role in sport—sportspeople often do the 
wrong thing or fail to meet the standards they, or others, set. These emotions are 
prevalent in sport and to understand these sports, and our attitudes towards ourselves 
and others as participants in them, we need to understand these emotions. But what 
about a player who shows no fault, does no wrong, does not fail to meet any standard, yet 
still fails? How should a player respond to the misplaced but well-planned shot or to the 
shot that is well-executed but just fails to stay in because the wind gusts it out of play? 
And why would such reactions be important? In the rest of this paper, I will argue that 
agent-regret is the appropriate reaction here and that it is a central emotion in sport. 
A proper understanding of agent-regret and the underlying picture of agency will 
allow us to better understand the failures of sporting agents; and it will allow us to resist a 
particularly noxious element we can find manifested in sports: 
The critical position holds that whenever a player fails it is because she was at 
fault or failed to meet some standard; she deserves to be criticised as at fault, 
or as deficient.5 
Commentators, fans, teammates, and the sporting agent herself can all take up this 
position. In the first-personal case it leads to guilt or shame, in the third-personal it leads 
to blame. My picture will suggest that this is mistaken and a softer—and more accurate—
judgment is due. I will focus on the first-personal reaction of agent-regret, but my 
arguments tell just as much against the critical position as adopted by commentators, 
fans, and teammates.  
Two sporting cases 
I want to look at two losing moments from World Cup finals to motivate why we need to 
make sense of agent-regret. They both show highly skilled and committed players who—
through no fault of their own—failed in momentous ways. 
Roberto Baggio missing his penalty against Brazil in 1994. Roberto Baggio was a great 
penalty taker: ‘I don’t want to brag but I’ve only ever missed a couple of penalties in my 
career’ (Baggio 2002). As he stepped up to take his penalty in the 1994 World Cup final, 
he had the following thought: 
[Cláudio] Taffarel [the Brazilian goalkeeper] always dived so I decided to 
shoot for the middle, about halfway up, so he couldn’t get it with his feet. It 
                                                 
5 Thanks to Alfred Archer for offering this position as a contrast. 
 
 
was an intelligent decision because Taffarel did go to his left, and he would 
never have got to the shot I planned. (Baggio 2002) 
Baggio’s approach was smart. He didn’t just decide to thwack it, he didn’t go for the 
showy option; rather he carefully thought where he would put his penalty. But he missed. 
‘I failed that time’ (Baggio 2002). No matter that two other Italy players had missed 
already so Brazil would have won had they scored their last penalty even if Baggio had 
scored his. Because he missed that penalty Italy lost the World Cup.  
Moacir Barbosa conceding against Uruguay in 1950. Moacir Barbosa was Brazil’s 
goalkeeper for the 1950 World Cup. In the final game, Brazil faced Uruguay and were 
drawing 1-1.6 Had the score remained 1-1, Brazil would, under the system in place, have 
won the World Cup. But Barbosa, just off his line, conceded a shot from Alcides 
Gigghia. Maybe we put this down as a mistake or a misjudgement. But on at least one 
plausible understanding of this situation, Barbosa did the right thing. He was beaten at 
the near post because he was slightly off his line, but Barbosa quite reasonably expected 
Gigghia to put in a cross, so he prepared for one by being a little off his line. He did the 
right thing, he just got unlucky: in preparing for a cross he made himself more vulnerable 
at the near post, yet had he covered his near post he would have been more vulnerable to 
a cross.  
Neither player was deficient, and neither did anything wrong nor exhibited any 
sort of fault. Thus, the critical position would be inappropriate here: it would be 
inappropriate to feel guilt or shame, or for third-parties to blame these players. They 
failed, but this was through no fault of their own. Agent-regret is, I suggest, the 
appropriate first-personal reaction to such failure.  
Agent-regret 
What exactly is agent-regret? Bernard Williams introduced the notion, and provided us 
with perhaps the most vivid case: ‘The lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over 
a child’ (Williams 1981, 28). How could he run over a child through no fault of his own? 
Perhaps the child was walking alongside the road and stumbled, too late for the driver to 
do anything about it. The driver was not drunk nor was he speeding; if he was, he would 
have been at fault. But, on an ordinary understanding of what it means to be at fault, we 
can say that the lorry driver did nothing wrong nor was he at fault. Williams’s point was 
that although the driver was not at fault, we do not expect him to feel mere regret. His 
involvement means that his emotion should be directed to his own actions, rather than 
just at the badness of the outcome. So he should not feel ordinary regret, nor should he 
feel guilt (Williams 1981, 30). Williams thought that instead that the driver should feel 
agent-regret. 
When one feels agent-regret, one evaluates one’s action as bad, as a failure. The 
lorry driver failed insofar as he, rather than driving safely, killed a child. Yet we should 
not be misled into thinking that agent-regret occurs only in horrific cases. Agent-regret is 
commonplace. We might feel agent-regret after spilling another person’s pint, dropping 
red wine on a white couch, or bumping into someone. I will focus on fairly momentous 
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events like Baggio’s miss, but the Sunday League player might also feel agent-regret for 
fluffing a shot.  
Agent-regret is a self-directed negative emotion that focusses on one’s failure 
in action, where this failure is through no fault of one’s own and does not 
imply that one failed to meet a standard.7  
Baggio and Barbosa should feel agent-regret. On my understanding, neither player did 
anything wrong, neither player demonstrated any flaw in themselves. Their well-honed 
skills that they appropriately chose to use failed to bring about the intended outcome. 
Their actions were bad because those actions were failures, and this is the object of agent-
regret.  
But how can our actions (rather than just their outcomes) be bad—how can they 
be the sorts of thing that we regret—if we are not at fault? And what is it that we might 
feel bad about in such a case? Julie Tannenbaum provides an illuminating discussion. 
After exploring the case we discussed above where she hits the tennis ball out because she 
failed to take account of the wind, she offers a contrast case: 
Now consider a situation in which my decision is flawless… yet in spite of my 
best intentions, effort, and attention I hit the ball out. [A] Suppose that I hit 
the ball out simply as a failure in execution, as happens to even the best 
tennis players in the world. My body does not do precisely what I instructed it 
to do. [B] Or suppose that I hit the ball out due to a slight increase in the 
wind that could not reasonably have been expected. In this case my body does 
what I instructed it to do, but given the wind, my action is not what I 
intended. How should I evaluate these actions of mine? I cannot find fault 
with them insofar as I look to the decisions that led to them. But I can find 
fault with my actions insofar as they fail to realize the end I set for myself, 
namely playing tennis well. So the actions are not a success.8 (Tannenbaum 
2007, 53)  
It is a failure to hit the ball out and it is a bad thing, especially when one wants to win the 
game. But Tannenbaum brings out something central: that our actions can be failures, or 
can be bad, through no fault of our own (see also [De Wachter 1985, 54]).  
In cases like A, it is the simple fact that ‘even the best tennis player in the world’ 
sometimes fails to execute the shot properly; even Serena Williams sometimes aims in the 
right spot but hits the ball too hard or too wide. In cases like B, it is bad luck (like a gust 
of wind) that intervenes and puts the ball out. Baggio and Barbosa, as presented, are cases 
of A. We can also imagine them as cases of B: if Taffarel had pulled off a wonder-save or 
Gigghia hit a sublime shot that no keeper could have stopped, we might see this as the 
intervention of bad luck (at least from the perspectives of Baggio or Barbosa). But in one 
important respect, these two points—that none of us is perfect and luck can always 
intervene—are similar: no matter what we do, we lack perfect control over the world. This 
                                                 
7 The way in which one fails might matter to agent-regret (Williams 1981, 25–26, 36). I discuss this, as well 
as some developments to the attitude we should take towards our failures, in (Wojtowicz 2018). 
8 [A] and [B] are my labels. 
 
 
is why even the best tennis player in the world sometimes fails to hit a shot successfully, 
and why we cannot guarantee our actions against the influence of wind or wondersaves. I 
now want to discuss a picture of agency that bolsters this, and which suggests that the 
critical position, where every failure is due to a fault or a deficiency, is wrong.  
A theory of action 
Think about what counts as my action. If I am being judged for my actions, then 
shouldn’t those judgments just focus on what is down to me (Nagel 1979, 25)? Add in the 
beguiling thought that only my will is in my control, then we get to the idea that what 
counts as my action, and judgments about me in light of this, should be based solely on 
the content of my will. On this picture, what counts as down to me—and what I can be 
judged for—depends on ‘the ultimately fair basis of [my] own contribution’ (Williams 
1985, 194). And if we think that I deserve praise only for what I control, we get into the 
issues about desert in sport that concern the fact that I did not choose to have my talents 
or predispositions in the first place, so even these cannot form the basis of judgments 
about me (see Simon [2007]; Loland [2016]; Carr [1999]; S. P. Morris [2015]). But I will 
not discuss this debate because I will not buy into this control-based view of action and 
assessment. 
This picture of agency has serious issues. Almost nothing in the world is in my 
absolute control, so virtually nothing that extends past my mind will be an action of mine 
(See Nagel 1979). Williams’s point in introducing agent-regret was that our susceptibility 
to agent-regret showed that such a picture of agency is clearly mistaken (Williams 1981, 
29–30). Instead of trying to argue why this conception of agency is mistaken, I want to set 
out an alternative that develops some thoughts from Joseph Raz, demonstrate how 
plausible it is, and show how it underpins both agent-regret and—the upside of this 
picture of action—glory in sport. On this picture, we are responsible for what we are able 
to do or avoid. Something counts as down to me if it came about due to my ability, or 
due to my abilities failing to bring about what I was able to bring about. We are 
responsible for these successes or failures.  
On the control-based picture, being a human in the world is like ‘being in an 
alien environment, tossed about on the waves of fortune whenever we venture beyond 
our thoughts and intentions’ (Raz 2011, 237). How are we able to make a mark on the 
world if we are tossed about on the waves of fortune? The despairing thought—a thought 
we find in Nagel (1979), although one that he tries to ameliorate—is that we lack absolute 
control, absolute control is required for agency, so we are not agents capable of any 
impact on the world qua agents.  
Raz offers us an alternative. Sometimes we gamble and are at the whim of things 
totally outside our influence; yet in other cases ‘actions, while depending on matters over 
which we have little influence, are not gambles’ (Raz 2011, 237). We need to distinguish 
between ‘playing roulette’ and ‘cooking, eating, shopping’ and other such activities (Raz 
2011, 238). The former is a gamble, its result a fluke; the latter are not, even though they 
depend on some luck for their success. Even though these latter activities require luck, 
such as having the right opportunity or your stove not breaking as you fry an egg, they 
also require judgment over when they will (most likely) succeed, and the exercise of 
various skills (Raz 2011, 238).  
Let’s say that one has a skill, or an ability to bring about an outcome, if one can 
bring about that outcome through purposively setting out to achieve it. I have carried tea 
 
 
across the room many times without spilling it, so I could have avoided spilling it this 
time even though I spilled it all down myself (Raz 2013, 223).9 What matters on this 
picture is that I have the capacity, the ability, the skill to bring about this outcome.  
On this account, some outcomes are lucky and are flukes, akin to Raz’s gambles. 
In sports, this is no achievement if the wind carries my long pass into the net (Simon 
2007, 13). It’s barely true that I scored the goal; rather, I kicked it and it flew into the net. 
Here, we are tossed about by the waves of fortune. Yet sometimes we are not tossed about 
by these waves, we surf them. Sometimes, although I needed luck on my side, the 
outcome arose in virtue of my skill. It only happened because of my skill (and some luck). If 
an outcome arose due to my skill it is no fluke (Simon 2007, 15–16).10 If it came about 
due to my skill, I scored the goal and I can rightly be praised for it. What’s more, in such 
a situation I can react not just to some outcome, but to my own action. I can revel in my 
own success. 
When agents utilise certain skills, even if they depend on luck to bear fruit, 
certain outcomes are down to that agent, and that agent can be held responsible for those 
outcomes.11 That is the basic account. But Raz’s own position won’t help us with sporting 
cases. There’s quite a lot of space between a gamble and something like frying an egg, 
which is almost certain to be successful. Raz plumps for a fairly conservative approach 
and thinks we are responsible for the outcomes we create in the world when they are in 
our ‘domain of secure competence’ (Raz 2011, 245). Something is in one’s domain of 
secure competence if one can perform the task knowing that one would succeed if one 
tried (Raz 2013, 223). But this is too restrictive for many outcomes. It strikes me that 
abilities can include scoring a free-kick or hitting the bullseye. One can bring about these 
outcomes given one is a skilled footballer or a darts player, but one might not bring them 
about in many instances even when one tries, and one might not know that one would 
succeed if one tried. 
Even when a masterful set-piece taker like David Beckham sets himself to score 
the free-kick, he might not score; and he might not even have a probabilistically high 
chance of doing so.12 Yet it is no fluke that he scores.13 This is an achievement, and it is 
David Beckham’s achievement because his skills lead to the ball going in the net. In fact, 
this lack of certainty seems to be central to sporting achievement. After all, sports are 
partly about doing difficult things. We want sports players to do these difficult things, we 
want them to score free kicks or play wonderful passes. As Frans De Wachter put it, 
‘There is no greater thrill than the long shot that hits to the millimeter—even though no 
player in the world has this constantly and completely under control (or better, precisely 
                                                 
9 This uses a general notion of “can” that doesn’t imply that on this very occasion I could have succeeded. 
See (Perry 2001, 103 note 51; Raz 2011, 246–47; Honoré 1999a). 
10 Simon develops this as a thesis about desert: a player who hits a fluke does not deserve praise, whereas 
someone who gets lucky due to skill might.  
11 It won’t always be clear whether something is down to skill or luck, and there will clearly be degrees of 
luck and skill involved. The distinction is “soft” (Raz 2011, 237).  
12 I put this in terms of making a decision and then utilising a skill. This is simplified for ease of discussion, 
but I intend my arguments also to apply to a more complicated picture. For a discussion of the ways 
in which we might consciously, or not, control our actions in the context of sports see (Papineau 
2017, pt. I).  
13 We can add that scoring must be guided by his abilities, see (Perry 2001, 82–83). 
 
 
for this reason)’ (De Wachter 1985, 58). Our skills are fallible, and they need luck. 
Sporting glory seems to rely on these difficult and imperfect skills.14  
But these fallible abilities come with a cost.15 They leave us responsible for the 
outcomes we create in the world but also for things that arises because of our actions but 
which we could have avoided through our success (Raz 2011, 244–45).16 For instance, 
someone who picks up a vase ‘which slips from his fingers and breaks’ is responsible for 
smashing the vase because he could pick up a vase safely (Raz 2011, 244).17 Likewise, the 
lorry driver did not intend to hit the child, but it came about as a consequence of his 
actions and he could have avoided that outcome: the driver has driven many times before 
and not killed anyone. He could have driven successfully, but through no fault of his own 
he did not. His misfortune is that his skill in driving safely did not allow him complete 
control over the world. 
Return to sports. David Beckham can feel annoyed at himself for missing just 
because he could score. He is responsible for missing and feels bad about it because he 
could have avoided it by scoring. But the reason he did not score is not some deficiency in 
himself, nor is it that he took the wrong option; rather, he did not score because he did 
not get the right luck. Yet because he was able to score but failed—albeit through no fault 
of his own—his reaction to this is not like ordinary regret. It isn’t just that the ball didn’t 
go in the net; rather, he missed. His emotion is directed at his own action: it is agent-regret. 
Sport and agent-regret 
We can fail through no fault of our own because to succeed requires luck and sometimes 
we do all that is in our power but we do not get that luck. Agent-regret is the other side of 
sporting glory: we lack total control over the world so to achieve anything worthwhile we 
need to use fallible skills and when we succeed we can bask in this glory; but even if we 
do our best, even if we are neither deficient nor at fault, we can fail and feel agent-regret. 
I want to turn to two final points. Firstly, how this bears on Barbosa and Baggio and what 
this means for the critical position; secondly, I want to consider how reflecting on sport 
might help us to see the significance of agent-regret in life more generally. 
Let’s return to the cases we discussed above. How should Baggio or Barbosa feel? 
Although Baggio—in accepting both that he failed but also that it wasn’t, at least to some 
extent, his fault—does exhibit some of the symptoms of agent-regret, it’s clear  from 
Baggio’s (2002)  description of the event that there are many things he could, and did, 
feel. Mardean Isaac describes Baggio as a classic case of shame: ‘…the pressure of millions 
sealed him into himself, with nowhere to look but the ground, where alone his gaze could 
                                                 
14 I do not set out what sporting glory is, but in linking it to the successful exercise of certain skills I hope to 
avoid the idea that glory must be equated with winning. Arsenal in the late-Wenger years achieved 
some glorious moments of sublime skill but won little.  
15 Although the following sketch is brief and underdeveloped, I hope that it is a plausible outline of 
responsibility for failures. 
16 Emily Ryall asked whether this is causal responsibility. In short, yes. But I prefer to see this responsibility 
as thicker than merely causal and as akin to what Tony Honoré calls “outcome responsibility”, see 
(Honoré 1999b). I cannot here explore the ways that this differs from certain understandings of 
causal responsibility. 
17 Stephen Perry (2001) offers a similar account, stressing our abilities to avoid certain outcomes.  
 
 
not be met by the world’s’ (Isaac 2018). In Barbosa’s case, we find talk of him feeling 
guilty, but this is combined with indignation and anger over how so many others blamed 
him.18 It should be no surprise that such significant events arouse a multitude of 
emotions. My aim is not to say that we should expect players to have an absolutely 
accurate picture of what exactly went wrong and thus what exactly they should feel. 
Rather, my aim is to urge us to leave room for agent-regret and to recognize that often 
guilt or shame are inappropriate.  
What would it involve for Baggio or Barbosa to feel agent-regret? For one, they 
would have to see themselves as not doing anything wrong. I think that is the right result. 
They thought about something (or it was instinctual) and made a good decision. Yes, this 
decision backfired for Barbosa and Baggio’s execution failed, but—in one sense—they did 
as well as they could do. They put their well-honed abilities into play and these abilities 
just didn’t work out. Baggio’s ability misfired and Barbosa, in choosing to step off of his 
line, made it harder to save the near-post shot, but he (arguably) did the right thing in 
trying to stop the cross. Of course, they didn’t do as well as they could do in another 
sense: Baggio could have scored, Barbosa could have saved the shot. They took all the 
right steps so were not at fault or deficient. But because each player could have succeeded 
and did not, it is his failure. Thus agent-regret is appropriate.  
Isn’t this just a recognition that our abilities are not good enough? Isn’t shame the 
appropriate emotion? Here are two considerations against this thought. Firstly, what 
Baggio regrets is not any inadequacy, rather the object of his regret is his own action. The 
picture of action that I have sketched above underpins this: it lets us say that it was indeed 
his own action, and that action reflects on him because it arose due to his fallible skills. 
But agent-regret does not involve any judgment of his skills. Secondly, even if agent-regret 
must involve the recognition that we are fallible, surely this is different to shame, or at 
least to paradigmatic instances of shame. Fallibility is not inadequacy unless we start to 
feel ashamed by our very humanity. If agent-regret is a sort of shame, it is a peculiar one 
worth studying on its own. 
We need to leave space for agent-regret because neither shame nor guilt is 
appropriate, and agents are liable to gerrymander their emotion into either guilt, shame, 
or mere regret. By understanding agent-regret, we can better explain how they should feel, 
and move towards a better understanding (for us as philosophers, and for the participants 
in sports) of how sportspeople can react to such failures. We should recognise that the 
critical position and its tendency to encourage blame or guilt is not always appropriate; 
instead we should understand that not all of our failures come from faults or the inability 
to meet a standard. Players should recognise this and that agent-regret, rather than guilt 
or shame, is the appropriate reaction to such failings; fans, commentators, and teammates 
might regret the player’s failure, but they should not blame the player.  
Of course, agent-regret can also be destructive. It might put one off of ever playing 
sport again. But, although I haven’t the space to develop this here, Williams was clear 
that agent-regret had an ‘expression’ that involved trying to make up for one’s failure 
(Williams 1981, 28). Perhaps agent-regret can urge us from our past failures onto future 
glories.  What’s more, the better our skills the less likely we are to fail. As Robert Simon 
put it, ‘his skill is what enables him to be lucky more often than others’ (Simon 2007, 
15). More importantly, agent-regret will not involve the damaging sorts of thought 
                                                 
18 Not to mention the undercurrent of racism, see the discussions above in note 4. 
 
 
involved in shame (and perhaps guilt) that involve the sportsperson thinking they are 
deficient or at fault.19 Yet my point is not to show that agent-regret is useful, although I 
think it is. Rather my point is that it is appropriate, and to properly respond to our 
failures we should make space for agent-regret.  
I want to end by reflecting on why sports are apt at illuminating agent-regret, and 
how this might affect our views other areas of our lives. Baggio shows us that sometimes 
we can do something and, despite being well-skilled, we can fail; Barbosa shows us that in 
choosing one option you make it more likely that you succeed in stopping the cross, but 
you make it less likely that you save the ball at the near post. There’s nothing you can do 
to guarantee success. Given the discrete nature of sporting contests, partially isolated 
from the surrounding goings on of life, sports make this fallibility particularly obvious. 
Much as Barbosa had to make a choice, rugby players have to sprint to catch the player 
who has broken through the defensive line, but in sprinting they leave themselves open to 
the sidestep. Tennis players, in advancing for the volley, leave themselves vulnerable to 
the lob, but they can’t just stay on the baseline forever. Baggio was known as ‘The Divine 
Ponytail,’ but even his abilities were fallible rather than divine. None of our skills—at least 
none of the skills we exercise in playing sports—guarantee success. Playing or watching 
sport should make that obvious.  
I hope that the sporting cases vividly illustrate the impact luck has on our actions. 
But it also seems that reflecting on sport (both philosophically, and in playing or 
watching) might help us take up a clearer attitude to life in general.20 When we see how 
luck infects sports, when we see that even Lionel Messi can miskick the ball or even Paul 
Scholes can misplace a pass, we might be a little more sanguine about our failures and 
realize that, although we can achieve impressive things, we can rarely (if ever) guarantee 
success. Agent-regret is grounded in our status as human beings with imperfect skills. Our 
agency is imperfect and imprecise, yet we can perform actions that are hugely impressive. 
We can score goals from 40 yards or hit a perfect backhand. Much as glory comes when 
our abilities succeed, agent-regret comes when they fail. To feel agent-regret when one 
tries and fails (through no fault of one’s own) is to properly respond to one’s status as a 
sportsperson and as a human agent. We can do the best we can to achieve glory: we can 
hone our skills (thus avoiding shame) and can do the right thing (thus avoiding guilt). But 
to have a shot at glory—in sports and in life—we must run the risk of agent-regret.  
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